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Abstract
Swine are an important intermediate host for emergence of pandemic inﬂuenza. Vietnam is the largest swine
producer in South East Asia. Systematic virological and serological surveillance of swine inﬂuenza viruses was carried
out in Northern Vietnam from May 2013 to June 2014 with monthly sampling of pigs in local and large collective
slaughterhouses and in a live pig market. Inﬂuenza A seroprevalence in the local slaughterhouses and in the large
collective slaughterhouse was 48.7% and 29.1%, respectively. Seventy-seven inﬂuenza A viruses were isolated, all from
the large collective slaughterhouse. Genetic analysis revealed six virus genotypes including H1N1 2009 pandemic
(H1N1pdm09) viruses, H1N2 with H1 of human origin, H3N2 and H1N1pdm09 reassortants, and triple-reassortant
H3N2 viruses. Phylogenetic analysis of swine and human H1N1pdm09 viruses showed evidence of repeated spill-over
from humans to swine rather than the establishment of H1N1pdm09 as long-term distinct lineage in swine.
Surveillance at the large collective slaughterhouse proved to be the most efﬁcient, cost-effective, and sustainable
method of surveillance for swine inﬂuenza viruses in Vietnam.
Introduction
The 2009 H1N1 inﬂuenza A pandemic virus
(H1N1pdm09) emerged in Mexico as a reassortant virus
originating in swine1,2. This re-enforced the concept that
swine are a “mixing vessel” for avian and human viruses
and an intermediate host for pandemic emergence and
highlighted the importance of inﬂuenza surveillance in
swine3,4. As the H1N1pdm09 spread in humans world-
wide, the virus repeatedly transmitted back to swine
leading to several reassortants with local swine viruses5,6.
Reverse zoonosis from humans to swine appears to take
place more readily than zoonotic transmission from swine
and thus swine could act as a reservoir of some human
viruses or virus genes (as reassortants) long after their
disappearance in the human population7–9. Zoonotic
transmission of a swine H3N2 virus containing the matrix
gene from H1N1pdm09, designated as H3N2 variant
(H3N2v), has been detected in humans in the USA in
2011, associated with exposure to pigs at agricultural
fairs10.
South East Asia and China are hotspots for the emer-
gence of infectious diseases due to demographic, social,
agricultural, and environmental factors11. The Eurasian
avian swine and North American Triple Reassortant
(TRIG) virus lineages have been introduced to this region
through importation of live pigs, leading to generations of
a diversity of swine inﬂuenza viruses (SIV) through reas-
sortment12,13. Avian inﬂuenza viruses have also trans-
mitted to swine, probably due to farming practices in
which poultry and pigs are raised together in low biose-
curity settings, but these avian viruses have not got
established in the swine population12. H9N2, H5N1, and
H7N9 are frequently detected inﬂuenza subtypes in
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poultry, often raised in close proximity to swine, raising
concerns of generating novel reassortants with endemic
swine viruses because of the potential role of swine as a
“mixing vessel” for the avian and human inﬂuenza virus
gene pools14,15. Vietnam has a large swine population and
avian inﬂuenza viruses such as the highly pathogenic
avian inﬂuenza (HPAI) H5N1 are endemic in ducks and
poultry. Pigs and poultry are often raised in familial multi-
species farms with low biosecurity15–20 posing a risk for
inﬂuenza reassortments in pigs. Therefore, inﬂuenza
surveillance in swine is a priority in this region. While
human and avian (HPAI) inﬂuenza surveillance is con-
ducted in Vietnam21,22, swine inﬂuenza (SI) surveillance
has had less attention, especially because SIV does not
cause signiﬁcant morbidity and mortality in swine and is
thus perceived to be of low economic impact in animal
husbandry. Disease surveillance systems are often costly
and there is a need to develop cost-effective and sus-
tainable surveillance especially in resource scarce
countries23,24.
The focus of the present study was the development of
sustainable surveillance strategies for SI in North Viet-
nam. Surveillance protocols were designed and tested in
the ﬁeld for 14 months in 2013–2014, and their cost-
effectiveness was evaluated. The main objectives of the
surveillance were to characterize the SIV circulating in
Northern Vietnam and to describe SI epidemiological
features such as seroprevalence of inﬂuenza A and dif-
ferent strains in the farming sectors, dynamic of infection
including age of infection and potential seasonality.
Results
Sample description
Virological and serological sampling was performed
from May 2013 to June 2014. The study sites were a
collective slaughterhouse in Hanoi (nasal swabs= 2051;
sera= 964 collected), three local slaughterhouses (nasal
swabs= 681; sera= 677 collected) and a weaner market
(nasal swabs= 703; sera= 609 collected) in Hung Yen
province. The ages of the pigs sampled were 4 to
6 months old in slaughterhouses (no individual data was
recorded) and 1.5 to 3 months old (mean= 2.3 months) at
the weaner market. In the collective slaughterhouse, based
on ofﬁcial records, slaughtered pigs were sourced from 18
provinces, with pigs originating from 5 to 10 provinces on
a single ﬁeld visit (mean= 9 provinces). Overall, 88% of
the pigs originated from the Red River Delta (RRD) (40%
from Hanoi, 18% from Ha Nam), 8% from Northern
provinces and 4% from Central provinces. Based on trader
questionnaires, it was possible to trace the province of
origin for each pig for 58% of the sampled pigs (Supple-
mentary Figure S1). The large company sector provided
42% of the sampled pigs, 20% arose from the familial
husbandry sector and 38% had no data recorded. From
the previous network analysis, it is likely that the familial
farms were predominantly large farms25.
In local slaughterhouses, 93% of the pigs sampled came
from Hung Yen province, mainly the Van Giang district
(Supplementary Figure S1). The pigs originated mainly
from the familial sector (88%) including 53% from large
farms and 35% from small farms, and rarely from
large companies (3%; with 9% of missing data). Pigs in the
weaner market originated mainly from Bac Ninh in
the RRD (67%) and the remainder from other nearby
provinces (Supplementary Figure S1). Almost all these
pigs originated from small familial farms (97%) while 3%
originated from large familial farms.
Overall results of virus isolation
All nasal swab samples from the weaner market and the
local slaughterhouses were negative for SIV while 77 SIV
were isolated at the collective slaughterhouse (3.8% virus
isolation rate) (Supplementary Table S2). Although higher
isolation rates were observed in August 2013, February,
March and May 2014, (Supplementary Table S3), no clear
seasonality could be deﬁned. Virus isolation positive pigs
originated from large companies (21 pigs) and from
familial farms (13 pigs); source data were missing for
remaining isolates. All three virus subtypes (H1N1, H1N2,
H3N2) were detected in pigs from familial and company
farms. The isolation rate in pigs originating from com-
panies (2.4%) did not signiﬁcantly differ from those from
familial farms (3.2%) (χ2= 0.42, p= 0.52). Pigs with
positive virus isolates originated from Hanoi (17% of the
positive isolates), Ha Nam (12%), and from three other
provinces in the RRD (8%), with missing data for
remaining isolates.
Four viral lineages were identiﬁed based on HA and NA
sequencing. These were (a) H1N1 of pandemic 2009
origin (H1N1pdm09) (n= 16), (b) H1N2 viruses (n= 35)
with H1 related to seasonal human and SIV from
Southern Vietnam (Binh Duong, ‘BD’)26 and N2 of triple-
reassortant (TR) origin not related to Vietnamese SIV,
(c) H3N2 viruses (n= 25) with HA and NA related to
Korean TR viruses, and (d) H3N2 virus (n= 1) with HA
and NA derived from human seasonal inﬂuenza viruses
related to SIV from Binh Duong in Southern Vietnam
(Supplementary Table S2). Viruses from each of these
groups representing different regions of the phylogenetic
tree were selected for full genome sequencing, and six
genotypes were identiﬁed (Fig. 1).
Eleven of the 16 H1N1pdm09 viruses had full genomes
sequenced and all eight gene segments of these were of
H1N1pdm09 derivation, including the three A/swine/
Hanoi/411/2013-like viruses27 (Figs. 2 and 3; Supple-
mentary Figures S4–6 Trees for PB1, PA, and NS genes
are available from authors). Twenty-one of the 35 H1N2
viruses had full viral genomes sequenced and all were
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Fig. 1 Genotypes of the viruses isolated in Hanoi in 2013–2014. Genotype numbers were deﬁned by Takemae et al.28 Lineages: red: H1N1
Pandemic 2009; yellow: Triple-reassortant; blue: human-like
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Fig. 2 Phylogenetic tree for the full-length hemagglutinin of H1N1pdm09 viruses isolated in a slaughterhouse in Vietnam in 2013–2014.
The trees were constructed with PhyML. Branch support aLRT statistics were shown at major nodes with values larger or equal to 0.8. GenBank
accession numbers of retrieved sequences are indicated. Red: sequences from our study; blue: sequences from Takemae et al.28; green: viruses from
Vietnam from other studies including H1N1pdm09 from NIHE; black: other sequences from GenBank
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closely related to other contemporary SIV isolated in Bac
Ninh (BN) province in the RRD28 and had nearest human
H1 ancestral viruses from around 2006 (e.g., A/Hanoi/
Q591/2006; H1N1) (Supplementary Figure S7). The NA
gene and the 6 internal gene segments were all of TR
derivation (Fig. 4; Supplementary Figures S4–6). These
H1N2 SIV had clearly established a persistent long-term
stable lineage in swine.
Thirteen of the 25 H3N2 TR viruses had full genomes
sequenced; they were related to H3N2 TR viruses from
South Vietnam, Korea and USA29, the nearest ancestral
human viruses being H3N2 viruses from around 1996 (A/
New York/622/1996)28,30 (Fig. 5). Four of these viruses
had the NA and internal genes similar to other TR viruses
(full TR genome) (Fig. 4; Supplementary Figures S4–6).
Four others had M and NP gene segments derived from
Fig. 3 Phylogenetic tree for the full-length neuraminidase of H1N1pdm09 viruses isolated in a slaughterhouse in Vietnam in 2013–2014.
The trees were constructed with PhyML. Branch support aLRT statistics were shown at major nodes with values larger or equal to 0.8. GenBank
accession numbers of retrieved sequences are indicated. Red: sequences from our study; blue: sequences from Takemae et al.28; green: viruses from
Vietnam from other studies including H1N1pdm09 from NIHE; black: other sequences from GenBank
Baudon et al. Emerging Microbes & Infections  (2018) 7:123 Page 5 of 16
Fig. 4 Phylogenetic tree for the full-length neuraminidase of H1N2 and H3N2 viruses isolated in a slaughterhouse in Vietnam in
2013–2014. The trees were constructed with PhyML. Branch support aLRT statistics were shown at major nodes with values larger or equal to 0.8.
GenBank accession numbers of retrieved sequences are indicated. Red: sequences from our study; blue: sequences from Takemae et al.28; green:
viruses from Vietnam from other studies including H1N1pdm09 from NIHE; black: other sequences from GenBank
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H1N1pdm09, while another ﬁve had PA, M, and NP gene
segments of H1N1pdm09 derivation. The A/swine/
Hanoi/601/2014 (H3N2) virus with the nearest ancestral
HA and NA being H3N2 human viruses from 2004/5 (e.g.,
A/New York/391/2005)31 had NP gene of TR derivation
while the other ﬁve internal gene segments were of
Fig. 5 Phylogenetic tree for the full-length hemagglutinin of H3N2 viruses isolated in a slaughterhouse in Vietnam in 2013–2014. The trees
were constructed with PhyML. Branch support aLRT statistics were shown at major nodes with values larger or equal to 0.8. GenBank accession
numbers of retrieved sequences are indicated. Red: sequences from our study; blue: sequences from Takemae et al.28; green: viruses from Vietnam
from other studies including H1N1pdm09 from NIHE; black: other sequences from GenBank
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H1N1pdm09 derivation. This virus was similar to viruses
previously reported from Vietnam and Southern
China28,31. No viruses of Eurasian Avian (EA) lineage, an
SIV lineage predominant in China, were isolated in this
study. The study by Takemae et al.28 in Vietnam over the
period 2010–2015 also did not ﬁnd any EA lineage viruses
in Vietnam.
Thus, the 46 SIV with full genome sequences could be
classiﬁed into six genotypes based on the derivation of all
eight gene segments (Fig. 1). Five of these genotypes have
been previously described in Vietnam in previous pub-
lications27,28 and the genotype designations from the
study by Takemae et al. are denoted in Fig. 1 for ease of
comparison. The H1N1 viruses with all the eight seg-
ments of pdm09 lineage (genotype 1) have been isolated
in Northern and Southern Vietnam. The 21 H1N2 with
full genome sequenced (genotype 8) have also been iso-
lated in Northern and Southern Vietnam in 2012–2015.
The one BD-like H3N2 isolate A/swine/Hanoi/601/2014
(genotype 12) was previously only reported in Southern
Vietnam in 2011–201528. The Korean-like H3N2 isolates
from August 2013, December 2013, and February 2014
(genotype 14) were similar to viruses isolated in 2012 in
Northern Vietnam while the four ‘genotype 15’ H3N2
isolates from February 2014 were similar to those isolated
in 2013-2015 in Northern Vietnam. The four A/swine/
Hanoi/181/2014 (H3N2)-like viruses with all eight gene
segments of TR derivation have not been previously
documented in Vietnam. However, their HA and NA
genes cluster very closely with the TR A/Hanoi/415/2013
(H3N2)-like viruses (Figs. 4 and 5) with PA, M, and NP of
H1N1pdm09 derivation (genotype 14). Thus, it is likely
that A/swine/Hanoi/181/2014 (H3N2)-like viruses were
the precursors of genotype 14 and 15 viruses, which
acquired H1N1pdm09 gene segments via reassortment;
the internal genes of H1N1pdm09 lineage for these gen-
otypes were closely related to genes from H1N1pdm09
viruses circulating in humans in Vietnam in 2009 (Sup-
plementary Figures S4–6). These results suggest multiple
reassortments between endemic H1N2 and H3N2 swine
viruses and between endemic H3N2 swine viruses and
H1N1pdm09 human viruses. Among the three reassor-
tants with H1N1pdm09 virus genes, the H1N1pdm09 M
gene was the gene present in all three. On the contrary,
H1N1pdm09 HA and NA genes were never found in
reassortant viruses and were only found when the full
H1N1pdm09 gene constellation remained preserved.
H1N1pdm09 isolates
In order to investigate whether the swine H1N1pdm09
isolates had established a distinct long-term lineage in
swine or whether they represented repeated spill-over
events from viruses circulating in humans, we obtained
HA and NA virus sequence data from the National
Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology (NIHE), Hanoi.
They had reported that there were three main waves of
H1N1pdm09 infection in humans in Vietnam up to the
end of 201332. The ﬁrst wave started with the ﬁrst
introduction of the pandemic to Vietnam at the end of
May 2009 and lasted until early 2010; the second wave
occurred from November 2010 to April 2011 with a
secondary peak from June to November 2011, and the
third wave started early January 2013 and lasted until
around September 2013. In 2012, isolation of human
H1N1pdm09 viruses was only occasional. Fewer cases
were then detected after 2013, a fourth and ﬁfth small
waves occurred from February to April 2014 and from
March to June 2015, respectively33.
Within the phylogenetic trees, the swine H1N1pdm09-
like viruses of 2013 and 2014 were not monophyletic but
interspersed with the chronologically related human
H1N1pdm09 viruses of the same or adjacent year sug-
gesting separate spill-over events of H1N1 viruses from
humans to swine, each spill-over not establishing stable
long-term virus lineages in swine (Figs. 2 and 3). The HA
and NA of 934/2013 clustered with Vietnamese human
viruses from April 2013 while the HA and NA of 952/
2013 were most related to Vietnamese human viruses
from March 2013, both related to the third wave of
H1N1pdm09 circulation in humans in Vietnam. The
swine isolates from March 2014 (586/2014, 588/2014)
were closely related to human viruses such as A/Vietnam/
N44/2014-N/Feb from February 2014 (fourth wave).
Three isolates from May 2014 (838/2014, 872/2014, and
894/2014) were related to A/Vietnam/37271/2014-N/Feb,
a human H1N1pdm virus from Vietnam from February
2014 (fourth wave) and other viruses from 2014 from
around the World. The fourth isolate from May 2014
(788/2014) clustered with contemporary Vietnamese
human viruses from November 2013 for HA and January
2014 viruses (fourth wave) for NA. Comparison of the
dates of isolation of the most closely related human virus
and the swine isolate varied from 1 to 7 months.
An exception was three H1N1pdm09 SIV from 2013. A/
swine/Hanoi/411/2013 and A/swine/424/2013 viruses
from August 2013 and A/swine/Hanoi/568/2013 virus
from September had a long branch distinguishing them
from the human H1N1pdm09 backbone and had a sister
clade relationship with a human H1N1pdm virus isolated
in California in 2013 (A/California/09/2013), the closest
viruses from Vietnam being those from 2011–12, prob-
ably corresponding to viruses from the second wave of
H1N1pdm09 circulation in humans in Vietnam32. It is
possible that unsampled genetic diversity of human
H1N1pdm viruses in Vietnam contributed to the lack of
closer human viruses from Vietnam27.
As with the phylogenetic trees for the HA and NA, the
internal gene segments of the H1N1 viruses were also not
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monophyletic and were interspersed between human
H1N1 virus gene sequences (Supplementary Figures S4–
6). Taken together, these results suggest that the swine
H1N1pdm viruses originated from separate spillovers
events from human H1N1pdm viruses rather than as a
result of H1N1pdm establishing a continuous sub-lineage
within swine.
Potential transmission at the slaughterhouse
Isolates from a same subtype, isolated in the same
month and from the same pen were nearly identical in the
phylogenetic analysis for the eight gene segments (e.g.,
H1N1 411/2013_Aug/C5 and 424/2013_Aug/C5; H1N2
542/2014_Mar/C1 and 546/2014_Mar/C1; H3N2 434/
2014_Feb/B4 and 442/2014_Feb/B4) (Supplementary
Figures S4–6). On the contrary, some isolates which only
differed by the pen of sampling were genetically distant
enough to suggest they originated from different farms
(e.g., H1N1 934/2013_Nov/B2 and 952/2013_Nov/B5;
H1N2 907/2014_May/C12 and other May isolates; H3N2
Feb/B4 isolates and other February isolates). Finally,
sometimes isolates from different pens were nearly iden-
tical (e.g., H1N1 May/C9 and May/A6 isolates; H1N2
Mar/C1 and Mar/C4 isolates; H3N2 Feb/A2, Feb/A5, and
Feb/C2 isolates). In this instance, there were two
hypotheses: pigs from the same farm were dispatched into
different pens at the slaughterhouse or SIV transmission
occurred at the slaughterhouse infecting pigs from dif-
ferent farms. Either or both scenarios may well have
occurred. Interestingly, however, in May, nearly identical
H1N2 viruses were isolated from eight different pens (A1,
A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, B4, C11, C12), suggesting that SIV
transmission may have occurred at the slaughterhouse.
However, transmission at the slaughterhouse seemed
unlikely to occur as a large number of pigs arrive by trucks
a few hours before slaughtering, and on each sampling
day, the number of incoming pigs recorded in ofﬁcial
records was close to the total capacity of the slaughter-
house. Therefore, most pigs were likely slaughtered the
same day and cross-infection between pigs would be
unlikely as viral shedding has been shown to start from
one to 3 days post infection34. Also transmission during
transportation was probably limited as the provinces of
origin were within a driving time of 12 h; it was unknown
whether pigs from several farms were transported toge-
ther. The data on pig origins were not sufﬁciently detailed
to be used in this analysis. Our results demonstrate the
value and feasibility of molecular epidemiology to provide
insights into the transmission pathways of SIV. More
detailed data on pig origin and time spent by pigs in
transportation and at the slaughterhouse together with
environmental sampling in slaughterhouses would be very
useful to understand the roles of contaminated surfaces,
and potentially aerosols, in the transmission of SIV during
transportation and/or in slaughterhouses as surfaces and
aerosols have been shown to contain signiﬁcant levels of
SIV in barns with SIV outbreaks35.
Serological evidence of virus infection by different strains
The sera were screened with an inﬂuenza A reactive
ELISA detecting antibodies against the nucleoprotein
(NP) of inﬂuenza A viruses and positive sera were tested
with a panel of SIV antigens based on viruses isolated
during this study and also a European Avian lineage
inﬂuenza virus isolated in China. Only sera that were
positive in HI tests were regarded as true positives. A total
of 68% (628/927) of the ELISA positive sera were positive
by HI test. The overall HI seroprevalence was 29.1% (min
= 12.9%, max= 47.1%) at the collective slaughterhouse,
48.7% (min= 14.3%, max= 80.6%) in local slaughter-
houses and 2.8% (min= 0%, max= 15.2%) at the weaner
market. At the weaner market, sero-positive pigs were
1.5–3 months old. Maternal antibodies often disappear
around 2 months of age36, thus it was not possible to
assess with certainty if the sero-positivity detected at the
market was due to infection or maternal passive immu-
nity. However, the overall low prevalence level observed
suggested that in most cases maternal antibodies had
Table 1 Hemagglutination inhibition seroprevalence for the different strains of inﬂuenza A across locations
HI strains HI seroprevalence % (number of sera)
Collective slaughterhouse (N= 964) Local slaughterhouses (N= 677) Market (N= 609) Overall (N= 2250)
H3N2/415 3.4 (33) 1.5 (10) 0 (0) 1.9 (43)
H3N2/601 10.1 (97) 23.6 (160) 1.1 (7) 11.7 (264)
H1N1/pdm 14.2 (137) 23.2 (157) 1.6 (10) 13.5 (304)
H1N2/826 10.9 (105) 13.1 (89) 0 (0) 8.6 (194)
H1N1/EA 2.8 (27) 1.6 (11) 0 (0) 1.7 (38)
Total HI positive 29.1 (281) 48.7 (330) 2.8 (17) 27.9 (628)
All HI test results were included regardless of titer differences between strains of same subtype
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already waned or were not present, and natural infection
had not yet occurred. In Vietnam, inﬂuenza vaccines are
not used in swine. Pigs at the market originated exclu-
sively from familial farms, mainly small farms.
Taking into account all HI test results, H1N1/pdm
(13.5% seroprevalence, geometric mean HI titer g= 87)
and Binh Duong-like H3N2/601 (11.7% seroprevalence, g
titer= 161) showed the highest overall HI seroprevalence
across locations (Table 1). Only these two strains were
detected by HI test at the weaner market. The overall
seroprevalence for H1N2/826 was 8.6% (g titer= 107),
and seroprevalence for Korean-like H3N2/415 (1.9% ser-
oprevalence, g titer= 69) and H1N1/EA (1.7% ser-
oprevalence, g titer= 42) were much lower overall. Most
H1N1/EA positive sera had fourfold higher antibody titers
for H1N1/pdm (Fig. 6, Supplementary Figure S8) and it is
likely that these H1N1/EA reactive antibodies reﬂect
cross-reaction. This is in agreement with the absence of
EA virus isolates. Sero-positive sera were present in every
sampling month against all other strains isolated at the
collective slaughterhouse, except for the Korean-like
H3N2/415. The high seroprevalence level of H1N1/pdm
across sampling time and locations was consistent with
frequent isolation of H1N1pdm09 viruses. On the con-
trary, only one Binh Duong-like H3N2/601 virus was
isolated in the slaughterhouse in March 2014, despite high
seroprevalence to this strain. Korean-like H3N2/415 and
H1N2/826 viruses were frequently isolated from August
2013 and from December 2013, respectively, in the col-
lective slaughterhouse, but H3N2/415 showed low ser-
oprevalence levels, and H1N2/826 had variable
seroprevalence levels across time. By sampling design,
only half of the pigs tested by virus isolation were also
tested serologically, and therefore only 39 of the 77 virus
positive pigs had also been tested by serological tests.
Eight pigs positive by virus isolation were also positive by
HI test. Only one was positive by both analyses for the
same strain (H1N2/826, HI titer= 80), two pigs were
positive by both analyses for a same HA subtype but a
different strain (HI titers= 160-320), and ﬁve were only
positive for a different HA subtype (HI titers= 20–160).
In univariate analyses using all HI test results from
slaughterhouses, all strains showed signiﬁcant differences
according to the province of origin and according to the
farm category (H1N1/EA being the exception, but prob-
ably reﬂecting cross-reactive antibody). In ﬁnal models
(Table 2), the circulation of strains was signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent across the farm categories for H3N2/415 (higher
circulation in companies, OR= 3.6) and H1N1/pdm
(higher circulation in familial farms, OR= 0.55), and
across provinces for H3N2/601 (lower circulation in
Hanoi compared to Hung Yen, OR= 0.15) and H1N1/EA
(higher in Hanoi, OR= 3.4). Sero-positivity to H1N1/EA
(OR= 25.6 for factor “positive to another H1 strain”) was
compatible with cross-reaction. Strain circulation was also
positively associated to virus isolation in the same month
for H3N2/415 (OR= 2.0), and H1N2/826 (OR= 2.5),
indicating a new introduction or an increase in spread,
and negatively associated for H3N2/601, indicating this
strain was probably not newly circulating. Differences in
the circulation between small and large familial farms
were also investigated at the local slaughterhouses; such
information was not available at the collective slaughter-
house. No signiﬁcant difference was observed in the cir-
culation of the different strains among these farms, with
all p-values above 0.2 in univariate analysis (data not
shown).
Discussion
A total of 77 SIV of H1N1, H1N2, and H3N2 subtypes
were isolated in the collective slaughterhouse (isolation
rate= 3.8%), an isolation rate similar to that reported
from surveillance in farms in Southern and Northern
Vietnam28 and other studies across Asia37. We did not
isolate any SIV in the weaner market or farms. Interest-
ingly, there was no evidence that these weaner markets
were serving as ampliﬁers and disseminators of virus, in
contrast to what has been reported for live poultry mar-
kets. Our surveillance in the collective slaughterhouse was
therefore pursued further and represents the ﬁrst ongoing
long-term longitudinal surveillance program for SIV in
slaughterhouses in Vietnam; previous studies being
unsuccessful in isolating viruses in slaughterhouses in
Vietnam38–40.
All the H1N1 viruses with HA and NA of pandemic
lineage had all eight segments derived from H1N1pdm09.
It was clear that most of these H1N1pdm09 SIV arose
from separate spillovers from humans and were related to
different waves of H1N1pdm09 circulation in humans in
Vietnam. The isolates from August and September 2013
did not cluster clearly with 2012 or 2013 human viruses
from Vietnam and seemed more distant from other
human virus H1N1pdm sequences available. They may
have circulated for a longer period in swine as full pan-
demic viruses, as shown in the USA for viruses before
201441 or the longer phylogenetic distance of these viruses
may reﬂect unsampled virus diversity of human viruses
circulating in 2012 in Vietnam32.
H3N2 TR viruses of the Korean TR lineage were isolated
in August 2013 and then regularly from December 2013 to
April 2014. Some of these had all 8 gene segments of TR
origin while others had acquired M, NP and sometimes PA
gene segments of H1N1pdm09 derivation. The overall
seroprevalence of this lineage was 1.9%, suggesting this
virus was not yet widespread. Based on these observations
and on the very high identity to the Korean TR strain, a
plausible hypothesis is that this virus has been introduced
recently into Northern Vietnam by swine importation
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from South Korea. Indeed a report from 2006 mentioned
that Vietnam did import breeding pigs in the past from
various countries including Korea, but also USA, Canada,
Thailand, and Belgium42, but no recent data on live pig
importation from South Korea could be found.
Seasonal human H3N2 viruses are often transmitted to
pigs12 but few variants get established long-term in the pig
population. The BD-like H3N2 variants with HA and NA
that originated from human seasonal H3N2 viruses from
2004 to 2005 and internal genes of H1N1pdm09 origin
were ﬁrst detected in swine in Southern Vietnam in
2010–201528,30. Similar viruses with related HA and NA
were isolated in Southern China in 2010 and have been
found repeatedly since then31. These viruses from China
and Vietnam formed a monophyletic clade with the 2010
viruses from Vietnam in ancestral relationship. During
our current surveillance in Hanoi, only one BD-like H3N2
virus was isolated (March 2014). The NA and internal
genes of this isolate were all closely related to genes from
BD-like H3N2 swine viruses isolated in Vietnam and
Southern China in 2011 and 2012. While the BD-like HA
and NA are conserved, multiple reassortants with internal
genes of H1N1pdm09 lineage were found as shown by our
surveillance and by the surveillance in Southern Viet-
nam28 and China31. Serological analyses showed these
BD-like H3N2 viruses were widespread in Northern
Vietnam (overall seroprevalence= 11.7%) and seemed to
be the dominant H3N2 lineage, even though less BD-like
H3N2 virus isolates were obtained as compared with TR
H3N2 viruses. It is possible that these viruses are endemic
and infect swine early in life, thus being less likely to be
detected around the time of slaughter. This highlights the
importance of coordinated serological studies being car-
ried out in parallel with virological surveillance.
Fig. 6 Serological and virological distributions of different inﬂuenza A strains across time in slaughterhouses. Undet. undetermined strain,
i.e., HI titer positive to several H1 or H3 strains with a titer difference < 4-fold. Viruses were isolated at the collective slaughterhouse
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Although H1N1pdm09 internal genes were commonly
detected in H3N2 viruses, it is notable that the
H1N1pdm09 HA and NA were not found in these reas-
sortant viruses, as also reported in other studies in Viet-
nam and elsewhere28. Although regular spillovers of
H1N1pdm09 viruses occur from humans to pigs, these
results support the contention that H1N1pdm09 HA and
NA do not seem well adapted to long-term persistence in
swine28,41,43. On the contrary, H1N1pdm09 internal genes
appear to be well adapted to swine, these gene segments,
especially the M gene segment, being often acquired by
other swine inﬂuenza lineages and appearing to provide
an evolutionary advantage in swine31.
The H1N2 viruses with HA derived from human sea-
sonal inﬂuenza viruses of 2004/5 and internal gene seg-
ments and NA of TR derivation are well established in the
Red River Delta. They were detected by virus isolation
repeatedly from December 2013 to May 2014, forming a
monophyletic lineage and were detected by serological
testing from the beginning of the surveillance period in
May 2013 with a seroprevalence of 10.9% in the collective
abattoir and 13% in the local slaughterhouses. They have
also been detected in Northern and Southern Vietnam by
others28. However, such viruses were not found during
surveillance in Southern China31.
Table 2 Logistic regression results for the different
inﬂuenza A strains
Variables β SE OR 95% CI p-value
Lower Upper
H3N2/415 (AIC: 338.07)
(Intercept) −4.315 0.387 0.013 0.006 0.027 0.000 ***
Familial farm
Company
farm
1.269 0.573 3.558 1.195 11.331 0.027 *
Unknown
farm
1.134 0.645 3.107 0.842 10.698 0.079
Hung Yen
Hanoi 0.964 0.608 2.621 0.817 8.837 0.113
Other 0.074 0.599 1.077 0.317 3.394 0.902
Unknown −0.378 0.693 0.685 0.178 2.740 0.585
No concurrent isolation
Concurrent
isolation
0.690 0.325 1.993 1.046 3.773 0.034 *
H3N2/601 (AIC: 1078.8)
(Intercept) −0.465 0.110 0.628 0.505 0.779 0.000 ***
Hung Yen
Hanoi −1.918 0.307 0.147 0.077 0.259 0.000 ***
Other −0.191 0.198 0.826 0.558 1.212 0.334
Unknown −0.456 0.197 0.634 0.428 0.928 0.021 *
Before 1st isolation
After 1st
isolation
−0.632 0.170 0.532 0.379 0.738 0.000 ***
H1N2/826 (AIC: 946.59)
(Intercept) −1.920 0.173 0.147 0.103 0.204 0.000 ***
Familial farm
Company
farm
−0.543 0.285 0.581 0.329 1.009 0.057
Unknown
farm
−0.121 0.307 0.886 0.478 1.598 0.694
Hung Yen
Hanoi −0.224 0.353 0.799 0.393 1.578 0.526
Other 0.332 0.229 1.394 0.886 2.178 0.147
Unknown 0.572 0.327 1.771 0.937 3.392 0.081
Before 1st isolation
After 1st
isolation
0.914 0.180 2.493 1.759 3.572 0.000 ***
H1N1/pdm (AIC: 1179.9)
(Intercept) −0.636 0.112 0.530 0.425 0.658 0.000 ***
Table 2 (continued)
Variables β SE OR 95% CI p-value
Lower Upper
Familial farm
Company
farm
−0.601 0.168 0.549 0.393 0.759 0.000 ***
Unknown
farm
−0.846 0.206 0.429 0.284 0.637 0.000 ***
No concurrent isolation
Concurrent
isolation
0.278 0.142 1.321 0.999 1.744 0.050
H1N1/EA (AIC: 276.55)
(Intercept) −6.275 0.769 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.000 ***
Hung Yen
Hanoi 1.221 0.474 3.391 1.310 8.593 0.010 **
Other 1.173 0.437 3.232 1.366 7.726 0.007 **
Unknown 0.549 0.525 1.731 0.579 4.712 0.296
Not positive to other H1
Positive to
other H1
3.245 0.733 25.650 7.713 159.067 0.000 ***
Only sera from slaughterhouses were included *p-value ≤0.05; **p-value ≤0.01;
***p-value ≤0.001
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The EA-H1 lineages were frequently isolated in recent
years in Southern China31 but such viruses were not
detected during our year of surveillance and convincing
seroprevalence to these viruses was also lacking, many of
the EA-H1 reactive sera likely being due to cross-reaction
with H1N1pdm09. Thus we conclude that the EA lineage
appeared to be completely absent in Vietnam as also
supported by data from previous studies in Vietnam by
others as well as ourselves. This suggests movement of
SIV from China into Vietnam in the last 10 years is not
very common. However, BD-like H3N2 viruses may well
have moved in the opposite direction.
The study demonstrated a high circulation of SIV in the
pig population in the study area with overall HI ser-
oprevalence of 29.1% in the collective slaughterhouse and
48.7% in the local slaughterhouses (only 2.8% with
younger pigs in the weaner market). These observations
suggest that SI infection occurs commonly after the age of
3 months following maternal antibody decay as it has
been previously reported44. However, a previous study
performed in Southern Vietnam has been successful in
isolating SIV from 1 to 2 months old pigs from a company
farm30. In slaughterhouses, differences in seroprevalence
were observed between farm categories and provinces of
origin according to different viral strains, showing a
potential heterogeneity of circulation of SIV which could
be linked to various trade routes25 or contact patterns
between humans and swine for H1N1pdm09. However,
the high number of missing data on pig origin at the
collective slaughterhouse limited the statistical analyses.
Previous surveillance studies in slaughterhouses in
Vietnam have not been productive38–40. However,
slaughterhouse surveillance has been demonstrated to be
an efﬁcient means of SIV surveillance in Hong Kong and
mainland China31. While we found that surveillance in
smaller local slaughterhouses was not productive, our
surveillance in a large collective slaughterhouse in Hanoi
during the period 2013–14 led to the isolation of viruses
of four HA lineages (pdmH1N1, human seasonal H1,
human seasonal H3, TR H3) and six different genotypes
in Northern Vietnam. Farm surveillance in Northern
Vietnam by others during the same period detected three
of these HA lineages and ﬁve distinct virus genotypes28.
Surveillance in individual farms is logistically more com-
plex, more labor, and resource intensive and requires
acceptance from the individual swine farmers, many of
whom may be reluctant to participate. Our study suggests
that surveillance in large collective slaughterhouses is an
efﬁcient, cost-effective, and sustainable means of SIV
surveillance. The value of such surveillance would be
greatly enhanced if collection of information on the ori-
gins of pigs sourced in the slaughterhouse is improved.
Moreover, further studies including sampling on slaugh-
terhouse workers, who were not wearing any personal
protective equipment, would be useful to assess inﬂuenza
transmission from swine to humans.
Materials and methods
Pilot surveillance protocols
The selection criteria for the area of study were a high
pig density, diversity of farming systems (companies, large
and small familial farms), and dynamic and diverse trad-
ing practices. Based on the results of a previous network
analysis25, different locations were selected for sampling
of nasal swabs and blood from swine. Longitudinal
monthly surveillance in different premises for serological
and virological detection of SIV was performed from May
2013 to June 2014. In Hanoi, the main collective slaugh-
terhouse processing about 1500 pigs per day was included
with the sampling of 150 nasal swabs and 70 sera every
month. In Hung Yen province, three local slaughter-
houses (20–30 pigs slaughtered per day; 20–30 nasal
swabs and sera collected per slaughterhouse per month)
and a weaner market (100 pigs sold by market day; 60
nasal swabs and 50 sera collected per month) were
selected. The collective slaughterhouse was a large
building with 26 pens used by independent traders to
slaughter pigs purchased from various farms. On the
contrary, each local slaughterhouse was a place privately
owned by one trader (usually located near his house) who
purchased pigs from farms and slaughtered them. Data on
the farm of origin such as farm category and location, the
age of animals (market), the pen number (collective
slaughterhouse), and the trader’s name (market) were
recorded. The farm categories were previously deﬁned
within the network analysis25, brieﬂy small familial farms
were farms with a number < 100 fattening pigs per cycle
and < 10 sows, and large familial farms with a number ≥
100 fattening pigs per cycle or ≥ 10 sows. Company farms
were large farms, usually larger than familial farms, with a
different legal status. During sampling, there was no tra-
ceability system previously in place and the information
on origin of pigs relied on the traders’ memory. However,
in the collective slaughterhouse, general data on the
number of pigs per province of origin slaughtered in a day
were recorded by the slaughterhouse staff and made
available.
Virus isolation and sequencing
Sterile plain dry swabs (Copan™, Brescia, Italy) were
used for pigs over 2.5–3 months old, and ﬂexible naso-
pharyngeal ﬂocked swabs (Copan FLOQSwabs™) were
used for younger pigs. The swabs were inserted deep
(about 10 cm) into the nasal cavity of the pig and then
placed into a tube ﬁlled with 1 mL of Viral transport
Medium (VTM) containing antibiotics and bovine serum
albumin. The samples were placed in an icebox after
collection and then stored in a refrigerator at 4 °C upon
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arrival at the NIVR laboratory in Hanoi. The VTM from
the swabs were inoculated on Madin Darby Canine Kid-
ney (MDCK) cells for virus isolation the same day. The
MDCK cells were grown in 24 well plates in minimum
essential medium (MEM) with trypsin (2 µg/mL). Each
inoculated well was separated by an empty well in order to
avoid cross-contamination. The next day, the medium
was replaced with fresh culture medium. The cells were
observed for cytopathic effect (CPE) on day 3 or 4 post-
inoculation (DPI) and culture supernatant from each well
was harvested for testing by hemagglutination test (HA).
When CPE and/or HA was positive, a second passage was
carried out. Suspected positive cultures were tested using
a rapid antigen detection test Directigen™ EZ Flu A+B
(Becton, Dickinson and Company, New Jersey, USA).
Positive virus isolates were stored at −80 °C.
Nucleic acid extraction was performed from MDCK cell
culture isolates using QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit
(Qiagen) according to instructions from the manu-
facturer. Viral RNA was reverse transcribed, cDNA of the
HA and NA was PCR ampliﬁed and partial sequences
determined using Sanger sequencing. A multiplex RT-
PCR for determining the origin of virus internal genes45
was carried out. These data were used to select isolates for
full-length sequencing of all eight gene segments using
universal primers of inﬂuenza A viruses46 and next-
generation sequencing (NGS). Full genome of inﬂuenza
virus was ampliﬁed from the full-length second strand
cDNA using forward primer (5′-GCAGATATCAGC
RAAAGCAGG-3′) and reverse primer (5′-GCAGAT
ATCAGTAGAAACAAGG-3′), with AccuPrime Taq
DNA Polymerase reagents (Thermo Fisher Scientiﬁc). A
25 µL PCR reaction was prepared with 2 µL of second
strand cDNA according to the manufacturer then incu-
bated with the following cycling conditions: 1 min at 95 °C
once, followed by 40 cycles of 30 s at 94 °C, 30 s at 55 °C,
and 2min at 68 °C. PCR products were analyzed with 1%
agarose gel electrophoresis and ethidium bromide staining.
Then the products were sent to the Centre for Genomic
Sciences, HKU for NGS sequencing using Nextera DNA
Library preparation and HiSeq 1500 sequencer (Illumina).
Sequencing result data were matched to reference inﬂu-
enza virus genomes and call for consensus nucleotides
from the aligned reads with at least 100 times sequencing
coverage.
Serological analyses
Serum was extracted from clotted blood samples and
stored at −20 °C. The sera were screened using the
IDEXX ELISA Inﬂuenza A Ab Test (IDEXX Laboratories,
Maine, USA), which detects antibody to nucleoprotein of
all inﬂuenza A viruses47 according to the manufacturer’s
instructions, with a specimen/negative control (S/N) cut-
off value of 0.6. All ELISA positive samples were tested by
hemagglutination inhibition (HI) tests. Five viral strains
were used as antigen for HI tests. These were three virus
strains of different subtype and lineage isolated during the
study (human-like H1: A/Swine/Hanoi/826/2014(H1N2);
TR H3: A/Swine/Hanoi/415/2013(H3N2); human-like
H3: A/Swine/Hanoi/601/2014(H3N2)) together with two
other strains (pdm09 H1: A/California/4/2009(H1N1);
EA-H1: A/Swine/Hong Kong/4816/2011(H1N1)). The
sera were ﬁrst treated overnight at 37 °C with receptor
destroying enzyme (RDE) by mixing one volume of serum
with three volumes of RDE previously dissolved in a 0.9%
NaCl solution. Next morning, they were heat-inactivated
for 30min at 56 °C and diluted with six volumes of 0.9%
NaCl solution. HI tests were performed following the
WHO recommendations for animal inﬂuenza diagnosis48.
Brieﬂy, serial twofold dilutions starting with 25 µL of
serum in 25 µL of PBS were done in 96-well plates and 25
µL of virus antigen with an HA titer of 8 was added to the
equal volume of serum dilution in each well. After 1 h
incubation, 50 µL of a 0.5% solution in PBS of washed
turkey red blood cells (TRBC) was added to each well and
incubated for 30min. The plates were inspected with
tilting. The HI titer of each serum was deﬁned as the
highest serum dilution that inhibited hemagglutination
and formed a clear button of TRBC at the bottom of the
well with a tear drop appearance being seen when the
plate was tilted.
Phylogenetic analyses
The genomic sequences obtained for the virus isolates
were analyzed together with other closely related inﬂu-
enza viruses and viruses representing key virus lineages
and previously available SIV sequences from Vietnam.
The relevant virus sequences were downloaded from
GenBank and GISAID. HA and NA sequences from
human H1N1pdm09 viruses isolated in 2009-2014 were
kindly provided by Dr Le Quynh Mai, National Institute
of Hygiene and Epidemiology (NIHE), Hanoi32. HA genes
of H1N1pdm09, H1N2, and H3N2 viruses, and N1 and
N2 genes of viruses were aligned individually by gene
subtype using Muscle algorithm in MEGA 6.0647. Phylo-
genetic trees were built using PhyML with approximate
likelihood ratio test (aLRT) SH-like branch support48.
Branch support aLRT statistics were shown at major
nodes with values larger or equal to 0.8. For internal
genes, sequence alignment was performed using Muscle
algorithm as mentioned before. Phylogenetic trees were
built in MEGA 6.06 using the Maximum-likelihood
method (ML) with 500 bootstrap replications. Bootstrap
values greater or equal to 70 were shown on the trees.
Analysis of surveillance data
The analyses were performed in R 3.2.149 and data were
plotted using the ggplot2 package 50. Viral isolation rates
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and HI seroprevalence were calculated for the different
locations, over time, and according to the origins of the
sampled pigs. Pearson’s chi-squared test with Yates’s
correction for continuity was used to investigate potential
differences in the virus isolation rates according to farm
category of origin. Regarding HI test results, potential
cross-reactions between strains of the same HA subtype
were analyzed using scatter plots of the HI titers.
For analysis shown in Fig. 6, sera from slaughterhouses
were used. When there were sera positive to several
strains of the same HA subtype, the antigen with the
highest antibody titer (≥4-fold difference between the
HI titers) was denoted as the infecting virus; When the
difference between antigens was <4-fold, the strain for
the subtype was qualiﬁed as undetermined (e.g., H1
undetermined).
For each viral strain, a logistic regression was performed
using HI seroprevalence data to investigate whether there
was a statistical difference of virus circulation in different
farming systems and provinces and also to investigate
whether the serological results were related to virus iso-
lation on the same month. Only results from slaughter-
houses were used (pigs of the same age and from a similar
sampling design) and all HI tests results were included,
i.e., not taking into account potential cross-reactions
between strains of the same HA. The outcome variable
was whether a serum was positive or negative by HI test to
the strain of interest. The independent variables con-
sidered were the sampling location (collective or local
slaughterhouse), the farm of origin (familial or company),
the province of origin (Hung Yen, Hanoi, or other),
whether the strain used as antigen in serological testing
had been isolated within the same sampling month (yes/
no), and whether the sampling month was before or after
the ﬁrst isolation of the strain of interest. Each indepen-
dent variable was tested in univariate analysis. Only the
variables with p-values < 0.2 were then considered for the
ﬁnal model in the multivariate analysis, and in general, the
model with the lowest Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) was considered for selection. Also potential corre-
lations between independent variables were checked, and
variables considered too correlated were not included
together in the model.
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